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Abstract
This paper examines the cyclical nature of IPO activity in the UK. The results indicate
a lead-lag relationship between IPO initial returns and volume. IPO volume is sensitive
to recent changes in market conditions. There is evidence of industry concentration in
hot markets, and firms raise more equity during these periods. Overall, IPO waves in
the UK share similar characteristics with those in the US. The findings are consistent
with rational explanations of IPO waves. However, explanations based on investor
sentiment and market timing cannot be ruled out, since there is a strong positive
relationship between IPO volume and the market’s price-to-book ratio.
JEL classification: E32, G32
Keywords: IPO, underpricing, investor sentiment
1 Introduction
A stream of literature tries to explain the cyclical nature of the IPO market, which is
well documented using US data. Some papers argue that IPO waves emerge as a result of
improving market conditions (Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2005), whereas others favour a market
timing explanation such that hot IPO markets (i.e., the peaks of IPO waves) coincide with
windows of opportunity when the cost of equity is temporarily low (Alti, 2006).
There are also a few stylized facts documented about US IPO cycles. Lowry and
Schwert (2002) show that periods of high initial returns lead to periods of high volume in
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the IPO market. Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005) find that IPO volume responds to changes in
market conditions. Alti (2006) provides evidence that hot market IPOs issue substantially
more equity. Helwege and Liang (2004) find that hot and cold market IPOs are driven from
similar industries, such that ‘IPOs in hot (high volume) markets are not more concentrated
in particular industries than IPOs in cold markets’.
While the cyclical nature of the IPO activity in the US is well established, and the
stylized facts of US IPO cycles are identified, the same cannot be said for the UK IPO
market. The UK evidence on IPO waves is rather sparse. For instance, Chambers and
Dimson (2009) use long time-series data on IPO volume and initial returns in the UK,
but they focus on long-run changes in IPO underpricing, rather than IPO cycles. Other
papers on IPO underpricing in the UK tend to focus on determinants of underpricing
rather than its cyclical nature (see e.g., Levis (1990) and Brennan and Franks (1997)).
Rees (1997) documents a positive relationship between the level of stock market index
and IPO volume. However, he does not examine IPO initial returns and his sample ends
in 1994 before the launch of Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which has caused a
significant shift in the IPO activity in the UK.
The purpose of this paper is to fill a gap in the literature by investigating the IPO waves
and hot markets in the UK. UK is the most important IPO market in an environment
relatively similar to the US. We test whether the cyclical nature of IPO activities identified
in the US are present in the UK as well. We also report stylized facts about the UK IPO
market and compare them with those of the US.
Our main findings are as follows. The lead-lag relationship between IPO initial returns
and volume documented by Lowry and Schwert (2002) in the US is present in the UK
as well. Moreover, consistent with Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005), the UK IPO volume
increases following periods of positive market returns and low market volatility. On the
other hand, while Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005) find no relationship between the level of
aggregate market-to-book ratio and IPO volume in the US, we document a strong positive
relationship in the UK. While this relationship can be explained in a rational framework,
it is also consistent with the investor sentiment explanation and the results of Pagano
et al. (1998).
In terms of hot markets, we find that they tend to emerge when IPOs in the same or
3similar sectors cluster in time. For instance, while the UK hot market in 2000 is mainly
driven technology and telecommunications firms, the one between 2004 and 2006 is fuelled
by oil and mining firms. These results accord with the theoretical findings of Benveniste
et al. (2002), and contradict with the empirical findings of Helwege and Liang (2004), who
do not find evidence of industry clustering in the US hot markets. We also find that hot
market IPOs raise substantially higher equity. This is consistent with the US evidence
provided by Alti (2006).
Overall, our results suggest that the UK IPO market shares similarities with the US
IPO market in the sense that IPO activity is cyclical in both of these markets. Hot
markets in the UK emerge following improvements in market conditions and high market
valuations. Firms raise more equity in hot markets and there is evidence of industry
clustering in hot markets. While these pieces of evidence are consistent with a rational
explanation in which hot markets are periods when growth opportunities are abundant
and firms go public in order to raise the capital needed to invest in their projects, they
do not rule out a behavioral explanation in which IPOs cluster in times when stock are
overvalued and cost of equity is temporarily low.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data. IPO
waves and hot markets in the UK are investigated in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Section
5 concludes.
2 Data
We use market- and firm-level data provided by the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The
market-level data includes annual time series of the number of listed firms and their total
market value, and quarterly time series of the new lists and money raised by them. The
annual and quarterly time series go back to 1966 and 1970 respectively. The firm-level
data includes a list of new issues on AIM since its launch in 1995 and on the Main Market
since 1998. It also includes variables on industry, nation, issue type, price, proceeds and
market value. Our sample period ends in May 2012.
42.1 Market-level data
The number of listed firms and their total market values are presented in panels (a) and (b)
of Figure 1 respectively. Panel (a) reveals a decreasing trend in the number of listed firms
on the Main Market between 1966 and 1992. This trend reverses between 1993 and 1996,
but has been back since then. The increase in the number of listed firms on AIM since its
launch in 1995 compensates the decreasing numbers on the Main Market.1 Consequently,
the total number of listed firms has been more stable between 1995 and 2012 compared
to the prior period between 1966 and 1994. Panel (b) documents a steady increase in the
market value of listed firms starting around 1980 and reaching a peak around 1999 and
2000, before the burst of the dot-com bubble. During the post-bubble period, the market
value remains relatively stable until 2006, and then it starts to increase again, but only
to fall substantially in 2008 when the financial crisis hits. A comparison of panels (a) and
(b) suggests that while AIM-listed firms contribute substantially to the number of listed
firms after 1995, their contribution to the market value is tiny. For instance, at the end of
2011, there were about 1,400 UK firms listed in the Main Market and 1,100 firms listed in
the AIM (56% vs. 44% of listed firms). The market value of the former group was about
3.6 trillion pounds, while that of the latter group was only 0.6 trillion pounds (86% vs.
14% of market value).
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]
The number of new lists and the total money raised by them are presented in panels
(a) and (b) of Figure 2 respectively. The number of new lists includes IPOs, introductions,
and readmissions, but excludes transfers between the Main Market and AIM. Panel (a)
shows that, since its launch in 1995, AIM has grown rapidly to account for an increasing
proportion of the total number of new lists. Panel (b) shows that, while the number of
new lists has been large on AIM, most of the money raised is due to the new lists on the
Main Market, except the period between 2004 and 2008 when AIM has been most active
in its history both in terms of the number of new lists and the amount of money raised.
As a final note, some of the spikes in panel (b) are partially due to giant IPOs, such as
the 6 billion pound IPO of Glencore International Plc in the second quarter of 2011.
[Please insert Figure 2 about here]
52.2 Firm-level data
The firm-level data includes 2,761 IPOs on the LSE. 1,043 of these IPOs are conducted by
financial firms and the remaining 1,718 by nonfinancial firms.2 In our analysis, we use the
1,718 nonfinancial IPOs. The majority of these IPOs are by UK firms (1,306), which are
followed by US (54), Republic of Ireland (43), Australian (34), and Canadian (30) firms.
Descriptive statistics on the sample are provided in Table 1. While there were many more
IPOs on AIM than on the Main Market, the firms that go public on AIM are much smaller
and raise on average a significantly less amount of proceeds (see also Figures 1 and 2).
[Please insert Table 1 about here]
While the firm-level data includes offer prices, it does not provide first trading day
closing prices, which are necessary to calculate initial returns. Consequently, we search
for each nonfinancial IPO firm manually on Datastream and find 1,539 out of 1,718 firms.
The price data from Datastream is used to calculate initial returns for these 1,539 firms.
An IPO’s initial return is defined as the percentage change between the offer price and
the first trading day closing price.
3 IPO waves in the UK
3.1 Lead-lag relationship between initial returns and volume
The literature that documents time variation and serial correlation in IPO activity goes
back to Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). Ibbotson and Jaffe find that initial returns of IPOs
in the US are highly autocorrelated, such that the first order autocorrelation coefficient is
0.744. They find that the autocorrelation of monthly number of IPOs (i.e., IPO volume)
is even stronger with a first order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.83. They also investigate
the relationship between initial returns and volume, but their results show that the rela-
tionship is not strong. Lowry and Schwert (2002) re-examine this relationship using longer
time series and vector autoregressive (VAR) models. They find that higher initial returns
lead to higher future volume, whereas there is no strong relationship between volume and
future initial returns. They explain that the positive relationship between initial returns
and future volume can be due to the partial adjustment of issue prices to the positive
6information revealed during the registration period (see Hanley (1993) and Loughran and
Ritter (2002) for the partial adjustment phenomenon). The idea is that, positive informa-
tion increases initial returns due to the partial adjustment, and at the same time it causes
more firms to go public, but since going public takes time the increase in IPO volume
is only observed with a delay, hence the lead-lag relationship between initial returns and
volume.3
We investigate the relationship between initial returns and volume in the UK using
VAR models with monthly lags as in Lowry and Schwert. We use the firm-level data,
since the market-level data does not include initial returns. The firm-level data gives us
a time series of 204 months between June 1995 and May 2012. The mean and median
monthly volume of nonfinancial IPOs over this period are 8.42 and 5 respectively. The
corresponding statistics for monthly initial returns are 16.46% and 12.23% respectively.
Like in the US, both time series (especially the volume series) are highly autocorrelated.
The autocorrelations of volume are above 0.40 up to 7 lags; and the first and second lag
autocorrelations of initial returns are 0.42 and 0.35 respectively. There are 17 months with
no nonfinancial IPOs. 11 of these months are between October 2008 and October 2009,
when the effects of the financial crisis were felt strongly in the UK.
Our findings are reported in Table 2. In models (1)-(4), monthly volume is the depen-
dent variable. Model (1) is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. It shows that the
first three lags of volume explain 41% of the time variation in this variable. Model (2) is
a Cochrane-Orcutt regression.4 The second and third lags of initial returns are significant
at 1% in this model. Model (3) is a third-order VAR model. The second and third lags of
initial returns remain significant at 5%, and the first lag becomes significant at 5%. The
Granger F test shows that the three lags of initial returns are together significant at 1% in
forecasting volume. Finally, in model (4) we add dummies to account for the seasonality
of IPO activity (see e.g., Helwege and Liang (2004)). The second and third lags of initial
returns still remain significant, whereas the first lag turns back to being insignificant. The
lags of initial returns are together significant at 5%.
[Please insert Table 2 about here]
In models (5)-(8), monthly average initial return is the dependent variable. Model (5)
7shows that the first three lags of initial returns explain 20% of the time variation in this
variable. In model (6), the first two lags of volume are significant at 5%. They remain
significant at this level in models (7) and (8), but the Granger F tests suggest that the
lags of volume are together insignificant at 5%.
These findings are broadly consistent with the US evidence provided by Lowry and
Schwert: The UK evidence also suggests a lead-lag relationship between initial returns
and volume, such that the lags of initial returns help predict volume, and not vice versa.
Moreover, there is some evidence that the lead-lag relationship in the UK is positive like
in the US: The second and third lags of initial returns have positive coefficients in models
(2)-(4) (the first lag has a negative coefficient, but is significant only in model (3)).
3.2 The relationship between market conditions and volume
There is ample evidence on the positive relationship between market conditions and IPO
activity. However, there are disagreements in the literature as to whether this relationship
is due to rational or behavioural reasons. For instance, Pagano et al. (1998) study the
decisions of Italian firms to go public and find that while firms become more likely to go
public when the market-to-book ratios in their respective industries are high, their invest-
ments and profitability decline after their IPOs. They interpret this result as evidence
for a behavioural explanation, such that firms time their IPOs to go public when the
stocks in their industries are overvalued. On the other hand, Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005)
offer a rational explanation based on a model of optimal IPO timing in which IPO waves
emerge following improvements in market conditions. The basic idea is that when market
conditions improve, many private firms that have been waiting to go public exercise their
options around the same time, causing IPOs to cluster in time and form an IPO wave.
In this section, we investigate the UK evidence on the relationship between market
conditions and volume. We use three variables that capture different aspects of market
conditions. The first one is the level of FTSE All-Share Index each month. The second
one is the standard deviation of daily returns on the FTSE All-Share Index each month.
The third variable, which is a proxy for the real risk-free rate, is the difference between
the official Bank of England rate and the expected inflation rate each month. Expected
inflation rate estimates are obtained from the fitted values of an AR(12) process of the
8monthly log changes in RPI as in Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005).5 Since the theory links IPO
activity to changes in market conditions, we modify these three variables accordingly. In
particular, we calculate the monthly market return MR as the return on the FTSE All-
Share Index, the change in market volatility ∆MV as the first difference of the standard
deviation of daily returns, and the change in real risk-free rate ∆RF as the first difference
of the real risk-free rate. Then, we regress IPO volume on these variables. The results are
reported in the columns headed (1) to (3) in Table 3. Note that we include lags of IPO
volume and dummies for the first and third quarters as in Table 2.
[Please insert Table 3 about here]
The results in models (1) to (3) match those obtained by Pa´stor and Veronesi. In par-
ticular, IPO volume is positively related to past market returns and negatively related to
past changes in market volatility as predicted. This is because, increases in market returns
and decreases in market volatility both imply a decrease in equity premium. Decreases
in equity premium make the projects of firms more valuable inducing them to go public.
Pa´stor and Veronesi’s model predicts a negative relationship between the change in the
real risk-free rate and volume, but their empirical results show a positive relationship. Our
results in model (3) indicate that this relationship is weak and not clear in the UK.
The results of model (4) are consistent with Pagano et al. (1998). There is a strong
positive relationship between the IPO volume and the lagged price-to-book value of the
market. The model of Pa´stor and Veronesi also imply a positive relationship, but they
argue that IPO volume should be more sensitive to changes in market conditions rather
than levels of market conditions. They run a regression including past market returns and
past level of the aggregate market-to-book ratio in the market, and indeed find that while
past market returns are highly significant, past aggregate market-to-book ratio in the
market is not. They interpret this result as evidence in favor of their rational explanation
and against the behavioral market timing explanations. Our results in model (5) show that
the past price-to-book value of the market remains highly significant even after including
past market returns in the model. Therefore, the UK evidence does not rule out the
behavioral explanation. However, this result has to be interpreted carefully, since high
price-to-book values can simply imply the existence of valuable growth opportunities in
9the market rather than a misvaluation.
Overall, results of this section provide strong evidence that the activity in the UK IPO
market is highly sensitive to the market conditions. IPO volume increases following high
market returns and low market volatility. Furthermore, IPO volume is closely linked to
the market’s price-to-book ratio.
4 Hot markets in the UK
Hot and cold markets emerge naturally as a consequence of time variation in IPO volume.
Hot markets are characterized by unusually high volume and initial returns, whereas cold
markets are periods during which volume and initial returns are lower than usual. The
literature offers various explanations on why hot markets emerge. Benveniste et al. (2002)
present a model in which private firms in an industry enjoy an informational externality
when firms in their industry go public, such that if the information revealed by the market
is favorable, many more firms from the same industry go public. In this model, hot markets
are periods in which IPOs from either the same industry or close industries cluster in
time. Helwege and Liang (2004) do not find much evidence of industry concentration in
hot markets that took place in the US.
An alternative explanation for hot markets is the market timing hypothesis. According
to this hypothesis firms wait to go public during windows of opportunity when the cost
of equity is temporarily low. Once such a window of opportunity arrives many firms seize
it at the same time yielding a hot market. Alti (2006) tests this hypothesis and finds
that hot market IPOs raise substantially more equity than their cold market counterparts.
He also finds that hot market IPOs do not invest more than cold market ones ex post,
suggesting that the reason hot market firms are raising more equity is not their superior
growth opportunities.6
Note that the industry concentration and market timing stories can also be linked to
each other. As mentioned earlier, Pagano et al. (1998) show that firms in an industry
become more likely to go public when the market-to-book ratio of their industry rises.
Like Alti (2006), they find that firms do not increase their investment levels after going
public. In fact, they observe a decline in investment and profitability.
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In the following subsections we first identify the hot markets in the UK. Then, we
examine the level of industry concentration in UK hot markets and investigate whether
UK firms raise more equity in hot markets.
4.1 Identifying hot markets between 1970 and 2012
We use the market-level quarterly data on new issues between 1970 and 2012. A limitation
is that new issues include introductions and readmissions as well as IPOs. In other words,
the quarterly time series of new issues and IPOs are not the same. However, an inspection
of the firm-level data between 1995 and 2012, which is the period when we can calculate
the quarterly number of IPOs, shows that the two time series have a very similar pattern.
This is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 3. Therefore, we assume that the quarterly series
of new lists closely approximates the quarterly series of IPOs.
[Please insert Figure 3 about here]
Descriptive statistics on quarterly series of new lists are provided in Table 4. The
median number of new lists per quarter was 27 before the launch of AIM, which has more
than doubled to 60 after its launch in 1995. There is evidence of seasonality in the series
such that the median number of new lists is lower in the first and third quarters in both
the pre- and post-AIM periods. The median value of proceeds raised by new lists also
more than doubles after the launch of AIM and it also exhibits seasonality with lower
figures in the first and third quarters in both the pre- and post-AIM periods.
[Please insert Table 4 about here]
We now move on to identifying hot markets in the UK using the quarterly series of
new lists volume. The method of identifying hot markets varies across papers. Helwege
and Liang (2004), Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005), and Alti (2006) use monthly IPO volume
to detect hot markets, but each of these papers uses a different cut-off level to classify
months as hot or cold. Yung et al. (2008) and C¸olak and Gu¨nay (2011) identify hot
and cold markets on a quarterly basis, whereas Bustamante (2012) identifies them on an
annual basis. Furthermore, these methods differ in terms of the ways they smooth and
deflate the time series of IPO volume. Banerjee et al. (2013b) compare these methods and
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propose a robust and intuitive method. We use their method in this paper. This method is
essentially akin to a moving-average trading rule, such that hot markets are periods during
which short-run moving average of quarterly IPO volume exceeds its long-run counterpart
by a sufficient margin. In particular, the method involves three parameters: s, l, and
k, such that a quarter is classified as hot (cold) if the difference between its s-quarter
short-run moving and l-quarter long-run moving average volume is higher (lower) than k
standard deviations of volume in the past l quarters. We calibrate the method by setting
s = 1, l = 20, and k = 0. In other words, a quarter is classified as hot (cold) if its volume
exceeds (falls below) the average volume of past 20 quarters. Quarterly volume is adjusted
for seasonality before applying the method.7
The hot markets identified using this method are presented in panel (b) of Figure 3.
The first major hot market takes place in 1972, which is followed by a long cold market
that lasts till 1979. 1980s are characterized by a series of small hot markets. The market
is cold for the first three years of 1990s, but then a major hot market takes place between
1993 and 1994. After a short hot market in 1996, the next major hot market is in 2000,
which coincides with the high-tech boom in the US. Finally, there is a long hot market
between 2004 and 2006, which is followed by a long cold market that coincides with the
credit crunch and financial crisis periods.8
4.2 Industry concentration in hot markets
In this section we investigate whether hot markets in the UK are industry specific, such
that in each hot market IPOs are concentrated in a narrow set of industries. To this end,
we use the firm-level data, which includes the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)
code of each IPO firm. Table 5 shows that between June 1995 and May 2012, 62.22%
of 1,718 nonfinancial IPOs took place in hot markets and the remaining 37.78% in cold
markets. We identify 23 industries (4-digit ICB subsectors) with at least 20 IPOs.9 In
8 of these industries, more than 70% of the IPOs took place in hot markets. The figure
exceeds 80% in the software, telecommunications equipment, mobile telecommunications,
and electrical components & equipment industries.
[Please insert Table 5 about here]
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At first sight, IPOs in some industries seem to be less clustered in hot markets than
expected. For instance, one would expect IPOs in the internet industry to be heavily
clustered in hot markets, but 65.71% of the IPOs in this industry takes place in hot
markets, which is barely larger than the sample average of 62.22%. However, the figure of
65.71% is deceiving as it is an aggregate figure for all hot markets. A closer look at the
cross section of hot markets tells a different story as we show next.
To further investigate industry concentration in hot markets, we run a logistic regres-
sion, such that the dependent variable HM is equal to 1 if the IPO took place in a hot
market and 0 if it was in a cold market. The independent variables are a set of dummies
for the 23 industries in Table 5. The odds ratio estimates of this model are reported in the
second column of Table 6. The 8 industries that were identified in Table 5 as having more
than 70% of their IPOs in hot markets all have odds ratios that exceed 1 substantially.
That is, the odds that a firm from one of industries will go public in a hot market is much
higher than the odds that it will go public in a cold market. While 2 industries have odds
ratios less than 1, the difference between the odds ratio and 1 is not statistically significant
for both industries. Therefore, the odds of going public in a cold market does not exceed
those of going public in a hot market in any of the 23 industries. This is in contrast to
Helwege and Liang (2004), who find that computer hardware and energy firms cluster in
cold markets.
[Please insert Table 6 about here]
We further examine industry concentration by studying the 4 hot markets between
June 1995 and May 2012 individually (see panel (b) in Figure 3): (1) 1996 Q2 - Q4, (2)
2000 Q1 - 2001 Q1, (3) 2003 Q4 - 2006 Q4, (4) 2007 Q2 - Q3. The results are reported in
the 3rd to the 6th columns of Table 6. HMi is equal to 1 if an IPO took place in the ith hot
market and 0 otherwise. We mentioned earlier that it is rather puzzling why IPOs in some
industries, like the internet industry, are not as clustered in hot markets as expected. The
results in Table 6 resolve this puzzle. The second column shows that while the odds that
a firm went public in a hot market are 52% higher if that firm is in the internet industry,
the estimate is not statistically significant. This is because, there were no internet firms
in the first and last hot markets, and being an internet firm decreased the odds of going
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public in the third market. In other words, internet firms are not clustered in all hot
markets, but in the 2nd hot market only. Software firms are most heavily clustered in the
2nd hot market as well. Firms in the remaining two industries of the technology sector,
telecommunications equipment and computer services, are also clustered to some extent
in the 2nd hot market. Furthermore, firms in the telecommunications sector, fixed line
and mobile telecommunications industries, are heavily clustered in the 2nd hot market too.
Other industries that are particularly concentrated in this hot market and not in the others
are pharmaceuticals, publishing, and business training & employment agencies. Therefore,
the 2nd hot market, which coincides with the high-tech boom period in the US, can be
thought of as a result of the clustering of IPOs in technology and telecommunications
sectors, coupled with clusterings in pharmaceuticals, publishing, and business training &
employment agencies industries.
The 3rd hot market, on the other hand, is dominated by firms in the mining and oil
sectors. For instance, no diamonds & gemstones firms went public in the first or the last
hot markets, and they were not more likely to go public in the 2nd market, but their
odds of going public in the 3rd hot market were almost 200% higher. Biotechnology,
media agencies, and electrical components & equipment are the other industries that are
clustered in this hot market particularly. As a result, the 3rd hot market can be viewed
as a hot market of the mining and oil sectors that is supported by hot markets of the
biotechnology, media agencies, and electrical components & equipment industries.
The 1st and 4th hot markets are shorter and have less IPOs than the 2nd and 3rd hot
markets. These two smaller hot markets are not characterized particularly by any group of
industries. However, the 4th hot market follows shortly after the 3rd one with a gap of one
quarter only. As a robustness check we combine the 3rd hot market, the 4th hot market,
and the 1-quarter gap between them into a single hot market. The results reported in the
last column of Table 6 suggest that the mining and oil sector still dominates the combined
hot market. Biotechnology and media agencies industries remain heavily clustered as well.
Not surprisingly, electrical components & equipment industry becomes even more heavily
clustered, such that the odds of a firm going public in the combined hot market increases
by 767% if the firm belongs to this industry.
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We conduct further robustness checks. First, instead of running separate logistic re-
gressions for each hot market, we run a multinomial logistic regression where the dependent
variable HC is equal to 0 if the IPO took place in a cold market, or to i if it was in the ith
hot market. We choose HC = 0 as the base case and estimate risk ratios relative to this
case. The difference between separate logistic regressions and the multinomial regression
is that in the former case the question is whether firms from a particular industry are
more likely to go public in the ith hot market rather than any other time (i.e. all other
hot markets as well as cold markets); whereas in the latter case it is whether firms from
a particular industry are more likely to go public in the ith hot market rather than in
cold markets. The results of the multinomial regression are very similar to those in Table
6, so we do not report them for the sake of brevity. Furthermore, we run logistic regres-
sions for each hot market using sectors, instead of industries, as explanatory variables.
The conclusions do not change: technology and telecommunications sectors dominate the
2nd hot market, oil and mining sectors dominate the 3rd one, and electronic & electrical
equipment sector is highly clustered in the 3rd and 4th hot markets combined.
To summarize, the UK evidence of industry clustering in hot markets is much stronger
than the US evidence provided by Helwege and Liang (2004). It seems that long hot
markets with many IPOs are fueled by firms in close sectors and supported by clustering
in a few other industries. Since 1995, the first major hot market that took place in the
UK around 2000 is driven by technology and telecommunications sector and supported
by pharmaceuticals, publishing, and business training & employment agencies industries.
The second major hot market between 2004 and 2006 is driven by oil and mining sectors
and supported by biotechnology, media agencies, and electrical components & equipment
industries.
4.3 Proceeds raised in hot markets
Market timing and investor sentiment hypotheses imply that IPOs cluster when the cost of
equity is temporarily low. Moreover, IPO firms raise more equity during hot markets, since
equity capital is relatively cheap during those periods. On the other hand, according to
the capital demands hypothesis (see e.g., Lowry (2003)), if hot markets are periods during
which firms have more growth opportunities, it is not surprising that they will raise more
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equity to invest in those opportunities. Therefore, all of these hypotheses predict that
more equity will be issued during hot markets.
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics on median primary proceeds raised in hot, neu-
tral, and cold quarters. In panel A, we see that the median primary proceeds raised in
hot markets is about 25% higher (10.08 versus 8.12 million pounds in 2011). Moreover,
the median rises from 10.08 to 11.06 as we make our hot market definition stricter. While
the figures in panel A provide some evidence that firms raise more equity in hot markets,
they do not take firm size into account. It is quite a different matter when a firm with a
market value of 20 million pounds raises 10 million pounds, versus another with a mar-
ket value of 200 million pounds raises the same amount. The figures in panel B control
for this size effect. In particular we calculate primary proceeds raised as a percentage of
post-IPO market value estimated at the offer price. The conclusion does not change. In
hot markets, the median is about 3 percentage points higher (41.41 versus 38.67). Again,
as the hot market definition becomes stricter the median rises from 41.41 to 42.35 percent
and the gap between hot and cold markets widens to 5.7 percentage points.
[Please insert Table 7 about here]
More evidence on higher proceeds raised in hot markets is provided in Table 8. We
run a series of regressions that control for industry sectors and the market segment in
which the IPO takes place (i.e., Main Market vs AIM). In columns 2 to 7, we run OLS
regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of proceeds in columns 2 to 4
and the natural logarithm of proceeds as a percentage of post-IPO market value estimated
at the offer price in columns 5 to 7. The variables of interest are H0, H0.5, and H1, which
categorize IPOs as cold, neutral, or hot with an increasing level of strictness. As expected,
the coefficients of these variables are positive significant. Moreover, the magnitudes of
coefficients tend to increase as the hot market definition becomes stricter. As a robustness
check we also run median regressions. We use the same dependent variables without taking
the natural logarithms. The conclusions remain the same.
[Please insert Table 8 about here]
The evidence presented in this section suggests that UK IPOs raise more equity in
hot markets. We estimate that median proceeds raised by firms that go public during the
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hottest periods can be more than 6 percentage points higher than those that conduct an
IPO during the coldest periods. Overall, these results match the US evidence (see Alti
(2006)).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show that the IPO market in the UK has a cyclical nature as in the US.
The IPO volume varies substantially over time in the UK. For instance, while there were as
many as 250 IPOs in 2005, the number of IPOs in 2009 was only 5. The average monthly
initial returns in the UK also exhibits substantial time variation reaching levels of 100%
during the high-tech boom period of 2000, while averaging only 10% in 2001 following
the burst of dot-com bubble. Following Lowry and Schwert (2002), we investigate the
relationship between IPO initial returns and volume in the UK. We find that periods of
high initial returns lead to periods of high volume, which is the same pattern documented
by Lowry and Schwert in the US.
After providing evidence for the cyclical nature of UK IPO market, we investigate the
factors that drive the time variation in IPO activity in the UK. We find a strong link
between market conditions and IPO volume. In particular, UK IPO volume is positively
related to past market returns and negatively related to past changes in market volatil-
ity. These results agree with those in the US market obtained by Pa´stor and Veronesi
(2005). However, unlike Pa´stor and Veronesi, we also find a strong relationship between
IPO volume and past level of the market’s price-to-book ratio. While this relationship
is consistent with a rational explanation of IPO cycles, it also supports market timing
explanations, such as the one offered by Pagano et al. (1998).
We also identify the hot IPO markets in the UK. Unlike Helwege and Liang (2004),
who study the US hot markets, we find evidence of industry concentration in the UK hot
markets. In particular, the hot market that took place during the high-tech boom period
of 2000 mainly features IPOs from the technology and telecommunications sectors, while
the hot market between 2004 and 2006 is characterized to a large extent by firms from the
oil and mining sectors. Overall, our results lend support to models that predict industry
clustering in hot markets such as Benveniste et al. (2002).
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Finally, we compare the proceeds raised by UK firms in hot versus cold markets. We
find that UK firms raise substantially higher amounts of proceeds during hot markets.
The result is robust to firm size, industry, and the market segment in which the firm’s
shares are listed. It is consistent with the US evidence provided by Alti (2006).
Overall, the IPO waves in the UK are driven by changes in market conditions. Further-
more, industry clustering contributes to the emergence of hot markets in the UK. The fact
that IPO volume rises following improvements in market conditions supports the rational
explanation of hot markets. However, it is not possible to rule out the market timing
explanation, since IPO volume also rises when firm valuations are high in the market.
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Notes
1Part of the decline in the number of listed firms on the Main Market since 1995 is due to transfers to
AIM. Between 1995 and May 2012, 303 firms took this route, while only 130 firms took the opposite route.
2A large proportion of the financial firms are investment trusts, venture capital trusts, and real estate
holding & development firms.
3Banerjee et al. (2013a) offer an alternative theoretical explanation for this lead-lag relationship. In
their model, time variation in initial returns and volume is due to changes in market conditions. Initial
returns rise first as good firms lead IPO waves and signal quality with underpricing. Volume rises later
when (and if) bad firms follow.
4OLS regression of model (2) yields substantially autocorrelated residuals (the Durbin-Watson statistic
is 0.97). Running Cochrane-Orcutt regressions, as in Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), helps remedy this problem
(the Durbin-Watson statistics becomes 2.40).
5Pa´stor and Veronesi (2005) use the CPI. However, the CPI data goes back to 1996 in the UK, while
our data starts in 1995. Therefore, we use the RPI data which goes back to 1947 instead.
6On the other hand, Banerjee et al. (2013a) provide evidence that leaders in hot markets invest more
ex post due to their superior growth opportunities. In their model, high-quality firms lead hot markets to
signal quality. Similarly, Bustamante (2012) presents an IPO timing model, which shows that firms with
better investment prospects accelerate their IPOs when the adverse selection problem is severe.
7In particular, raw volume is regressed on dummies representing the quarters in a year. Then, the raw
volume is divided by the volume predicted by the regression and re-meaned to have the same mean as
the original series. This procedure is conducted separately for the pre- and post-AIM periods, since IPO
volume experiences a permanent shift after the launch of AIM.
8Vismara et al. (2012) detect a Europe-wide hot market between 2004 and 2006. They argue that
AIM’s success as an exchange-regulated market has contributed to the emergence of this hot market.
9There are 92 nonfinancial subsectors in total.
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Table 2: Lead-lag relationship between initial returns and volume
Granger causality tests for monthly time series of initial returns and volume. Nonfinancial IPOs in
the LSE between June 1995 and May 2012 are used. V is the monthly number of IPOs and I is the
monthly average initial return of IPOs. Li. signifies the ith lag of a monthly time series variable. q1
(q3) is a dummy for the first (third) quarter, such that it is equal to 1 if the observation comes from
a month in that quarter. The dependent variable is V in models (1)-(4) and I in the rest. Models
(2) and (5) are Cochrane-Orcutt regressions, and the rest are ordinary least squares regressions.
D-W stat. is the Durbin-Watson statistic. Granger F is the p-value of the Granger F test. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively.
Volume (V ) Initial returns (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L1.V 0.36*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.36** 0.34** 0.38**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
L2.V 0.18** 0.25*** 0.27*** -0.38** -0.40** -0.39**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.16)
L3.V 0.22*** 0.17** 0.24*** 0.09 0.13 -0.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
L1.I -0.03 -0.06** -0.03 0.22 0.26 0.17
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
L2.I 0.09*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.25** 0.25** 0.23**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09)
L3.I 0.09*** 0.07** 0.05* 0.02 -0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
q1 -5.98*** 13.37***
(1.21) (4.06)
q3 -4.36*** 3.88*
(1.15) (2.17)
Cons. 2.04*** 7.60*** 1.40 2.93*** 6.76*** 15.09*** 6.16** 4.68*
(0.53) (1.62) (0.91) (1.01) (1.91) (4.05) (2.63) (2.46)
Obs. 201 146 154 154 147 163 147 147
Adj R-sq. 0.41 0.05 0.37 0.46 0.20 0.04 0.22 0.30
D-W stat. 2.10 2.40 2.02 2.14 2.11 2.46 2.12 2.10
Granger F 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.06
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Table 3: The relationship between market conditions and volume
OLS regression results. The dependent variable V is the monthly number of nonfinancial IPOs in
the LSE between June 1995 and May 2012. MR is the monthly return on the FTSE All-Share
Index. ∆MV is the first difference of the standard deviation of daily returns on the same index
each month. ∆RF is the first difference of the real risk-free rate. The real risk-free rate is the
difference between the official Bank of England rate and the expected inflation rate each month.
Expected inflation rate estimates are obtained from the fitted values of an AR(12) process of the
monthly log changes in RPI. P2B is the price-to-book value of Datastream’s UK Total Market index
(mnemonic: TOTMKUK) each month. Li. signifies the ith lag of a monthly time series variable.
q1 (q3) is a dummy for the first (third) quarter, such that it is equal to 1 if the observation comes
from a month in that quarter. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.MR 0.14** 0.11
(0.07) (0.07)
L2.MR 0.06 0.05
(0.09) (0.08)
L3.MR 0.23*** 0.23***
(0.08) (0.08)
L1.∆MV -2.48***
(0.69)
L2.∆MV -1.44
(0.88)
L3.∆MV -2.32***
(0.79)
L1.∆RF -0.14
(0.14)
L2.∆RF 0.14
(0.14)
L3.∆RF 0.22*
(0.13)
L1.P2B 5.18*** 4.91***
(1.52) (1.49)
L1.V 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.23***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
L2.V 0.22** 0.22** 0.21** 0.16* 0.16*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
L3.V 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.23***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
q1 -4.86*** -5.45*** -5.18*** -4.29*** -4.69***
(1.07) (1.18) (1.24) (1.05) (1.06)
q3 -3.96*** -4.47*** -4.91*** -3.56*** -3.46***
(0.96) (0.94) (1.22) (0.97) (0.95)
Cons. 3.62*** 3.91*** 4.18*** -3.86* -3.59
(0.68) (0.68) (0.76) (2.24) (2.18)
Obs. 201 201 201 201 201
Adj R-sq. 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51
24
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on quarterly series of new lists
The sample is quarterly time series of new lists and their proceeds on the LSE between January
1970 and May 2012. The series on proceeds start in 1972. Proceeds are measured in billions of
2011 pounds. Median values are reported for each quarter separately in columns q1 to q4 and for
all quarters pooled in column All. K-W p is the Kruskal-Wallis p value. Pre-AIM is the period
prior to the second quarter of 1995 and post-AIM is the remaining period when AIM has been in
existence.
q1 q2 q3 q4 All count K-W p
Panel A: Volume
pre-AIM 18.5 33 27 36 27 101 0.06
post-AIM 41 72 56 72 60 69 0.30
Panel B: Proceeds
pre-AIM 0.86 1.71 0.99 2.12 1.31 65 0.08
post-AIM 1.96 4.95 2.95 3.38 3.02 69 0.06
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Table 5: Frequency of IPOs across industries and hot/cold markets
The sample is 1,718 nonfinancial IPOs in the LSE between June 1995 and May 2012. Industry
classification is based on 4-digit ICB subsectors. Industries with at least 20 IPOs are reported.
Cold Hot
count percent count percent
OIL
0533 Exploration & Production 39 42.86 52 57.14
0573 Oil Equipment & Services 9 40.91 13 59.09
MINING
1773 Diamonds & Gemstones 7 30.43 16 69.57
1775 General Mining 30 35.29 55 64.71
1777 Gold Mining 15 35.71 27 64.29
ELECTRONIC & ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
2733 Electrical Components & Equipment 4 14.29 24 85.71
2737 Electronic Equipment 11 36.67 19 63.33
SUPPORT SERVICES
2791 Business Support Services 38 41.30 54 58.70
2793 Business Training & Employment Agencies 14 38.89 22 61.11
HEALTH CARE
4535 Medical Equipment 12 42.86 16 57.14
4573 Biotechnology 15 36.59 26 63.41
4577 Pharmaceuticals 15 29.41 36 70.59
MEDIA
5553 Broadcasting & Entertainment 12 36.36 21 63.64
5555 Media Agencies 11 20.75 42 79.25
5557 Publishing 17 33.33 34 66.67
LEISURE
5752 Gambling 5 20.83 19 79.17
5755 Recreational Services 22 51.16 21 48.84
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
6535 Fixed Line Telecommunications 7 26.92 19 73.08
6575 Mobile Telecommunications 4 19.05 17 80.95
TECHNOLOGY
9533 Computer Services 44 48.89 46 51.11
9535 Internet 12 34.29 23 65.71
9537 Software 19 18.10 86 81.90
9578 Telecommunications Equipment 3 12.00 22 88.00
Other industries 284 44.17 359 55.83
Total 649 37.78 1069 62.22
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Table 6: Industry concentration in hot markets
Odds ratio estimates of logistic regression models. The sample is 1,718 nonfinancial IPOs in the
LSE between June 1995 and May 2012. 4 hot markets are identified during this period: (1) 1996
Q2 - Q4, (2) 2000 Q1 - 2001 Q1, (3) 2003 Q4 - 2006 Q4, (4) 2007 Q2 - Q3. HM (HMi) is a
binary variable equal to 1 if the IPO took place in a (the ith) hot market. Explanatory variables
are industry dummies. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
AUC is the area under the ROC curve. Perfect predictor industries are dropped in each regression.
HM HM1 HM2 HM3 HM4 HM3+4
Exploration & Production 1.05 0.14* 0.23** 1.79** 1.04 1.84***
Oil Equipment & Services 1.14 0.62 0.48 1.32 1.79 1.73
Diamonds & Gemstones 1.81 0.96 2.97** 4.09***
General Mining 1.45 0.50 2.60*** 0.43 2.65***
Gold Mining 1.42 0.32 0.25 2.55*** 0.44 2.12**
Electrical Components & Equipment 4.75*** 0.48 0.37 3.44*** 2.99* 8.67***
Electronic Equipment 1.37 2.60* 0.35 1.27 0.62 1.10
Business Support Services 1.12 0.75 1.37 0.92 1.71 1.06
Business Training & Employment A. 1.24 2.88** 1.22 1.03
Medical Equipment 1.05 0.78 1.65 0.66 1.44
Biotechnology 1.37 0.67 2.00** 1.41 2.04**
Pharmaceuticals 1.90** 0.53 2.77*** 1.23 1.12 1.28
Broadcasting & Entertainment 1.38 1.80 1.41 1.16 1.36
Media Agencies 3.02*** 0.25 1.29 3.15*** 0.70 2.81***
Publishing 1.58 1.41 6.51*** 0.41** 0.31***
Gambling 3.01** 2.02 2.26* 1.63 2.41**
Recreational Services 0.76 1.71 1.64 0.51* 0.43 0.44**
Fixed Line Telecommunications 2.15* 2.40* 1.91 0.72 1.69
Mobile Telecommunications 3.36** 4.03*** 2.10* 1.59
Computer Services 0.83 1.62 1.70 0.66* 0.50***
Internet 1.52 6.72*** 0.66 0.50*
Software 3.58*** 4.83*** 1.49* 1.09 1.53**
Telecommunications Equipment 5.80*** 2.52* 2.86** 1.56 3.72***
Cons. 1.26*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.52*** 0.06*** 0.69***
Obs. 1,718 1,277 1,677 1,718 1,462 1,718
R-sq. 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.05
AUC 0.61 0.63 0.71 0.63 0.59 0.64
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics on proceeds raised in hot, neutral, and cold markets
Median primary proceeds raised in cold, neutral, and hot markets. The sample is 1,718 nonfinancial
IPOs in the LSE between June 1995 and May 2012. In panel A, the primary proceeds are in millions
of 2011 pounds. In panel B, proceeds as a percentage of market value is equal to 100×(pro/(mv −
pro)), where pro is the primary proceeds raised by a firm, and mv is the firm’s market value based
on its offer price. The cases where mv = pro are excluded. Hi is a categorical variable equal to
1 (0) if the IPO took place in a quarter in which the volume of that quarter exceeds (falls below)
the average volume of past 20 quarters by at least i standard deviations of those 20 quarters, and
equal to 0.5 otherwise.
H0 H0.5 H1
median count median count median count
Panel A: Proceeds in millions of 2011 pounds
Cold 8.12 649 8.07 442 9.48 150
Neutral 0 8 452 8.54 967
Hot 10.08 1069 10.76 824 11.06 601
Panel B: Proceeds as a percentage of market value
Cold 38.67 547 38.15 372 36.66 121
Neutral 0 38.87 395 39.2 862
Hot 41.41 977 42.12 757 42.35 541
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(b) Market value of listed firms
Figure 1: Market-level annual data on listed firms
The main market data includes UK and international firms. The market value figures are
reported in trillions of 2011 pounds.
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(b) Money raised by new lists
Figure 2: Market-level quarterly data on new lists
The number of new lists includes IPOs, introductions, and readmissions, but excludes
transfers between the Main Market and AIM. The main market data includes UK and
international firms. For UK and international firms, the data on money raised is available
from 1972 and 1979 respectively. The money raised figures are reported in billions of 2011
pounds.
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(a) Quarterly series of new lists vs IPOs between 1995 and 2012
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(b) Hot markets between 1970 and 2012
Figure 3: Hot markets in the UK
In panel (a), the dashed line is the series of new lists in the LSE. The solid line is the
series of IPOs in the LSE. The sample period is between June 1995 and May 2012. The
sample includes new lists on AIM starting from June 1995 and those on the Main Market
starting from January 1998. In panel (b), the area plot is the quarterly series of new lists
in the LSE. Black and gray areas represent hot and cold markets respectively. The dashed
line is the 20-quarter moving average volume.
